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The  Commonweal th  Ch ie f  Medica l  Off i cer 
has emphasised the need to be prepared for a 
bioterrorism incident.1 Anthrax has already been 
used effectively as a bioterrorism agent, and experts 
believe it would be the most likely agent to be used 
in Australia.2–4 Australia’s last two clinical anthrax 
cases, both cutaneous and occupation related, 
occurred in February 1997 (Victoria) and July 1998 
(Brisbane).5 However, multiple ‘white powder’ 
incidents occurred following cases in the USA during 
2001.6 In New South Wales, for example, 990 white 
powder incidents were reported and samples from 
535 were submitted for laboratory testing in one 
month during 2001. This involved a massive diversion 
of personnel and resources, although no anthrax 
spores were found.7,8 
	
An	 anthrax	 fact	 sheet	 has	 been	 developed	 by	 the	
Department	 of	 Health	 and	Ageing,9	 yet	 little	 attention	
has	 been	 given	 to	 understanding	 the	Australian	 public’s	
knowledge	of	anthrax	or	likely	response	to	a	bioterrorism	
event.10	 Accordingly,	 the	 research	 group	 set	 out	 to	
explore	 these	 issues	 among	 adult	 Australians.	The	
respondents’	knowledge	of	smallpox,	and	prevention	and	
response	 strategies	was	 explored	 in	 the	 same	 survey,	
with	those	results	published	elsewhere.11
Method
The	 research	 group	 employed	 eight	 experienced	
telephone	 interviewers.	They	 rang	 private,	 randomly	
selected	 telephone	numbers	 in	each	state	and	 territory,	
proportional	to	their	contribution	to	the	adult	population,	
over	 18	 days	 in	 mid	 2004.	 Exclusion	 criteria	 were:	
children	 (persons	 aged	 less	 than	 18	 years);	 inability	 to	
participate	 due	 to	 limited	 English	 language	 ability	 or	
mental	 illness;	 and	no	 response	despite	 three	 attempts	
at	 different	 times	 on	 different	 days.	The	 questionnaire	
was	 pretested	 for	 length	 and	 comprehensibility.	 Calls	
were	conducted	between	10.00	am	and	7.00	pm,	and	the	
questionnaire	 administered	with	 verbal	 consent	 after:	
introducing	 the	 survey’s	 purpose;	 providing	 a	 guarantee	
of	 confidentiality;	 reassurance	 of	 freedom	 to	 choose	 to	
participate;	 and	 confirming	 that	 inclusion	 criteria	were	
met.	When	 individuals	 expressed	 interest	 but	 could	 not	
BACKGROUND
Anthrax bioterrorism is a new threat to Australians. How they would respond to an anthrax bioterrorism event is unknown.
METHOD
A national telephone survey of Australian adults.
RESULTS
We successfully interviewed 1001 Australian adults (response rate 63%). The threat of anthrax bioterrorism was of 
medium to high concern to 57% of survey participants. In the event of an anthrax bioterrorism event, the first point of 
care would be GPs for 60% of survey participants, and 71% were confident in their doctor’s ability to recognise anthrax. 
Most would accept vaccination if anthrax bioterrorism cases were reported locally, or even elsewhere in Australia.
DISCUSSION
Australian GPs should be included in any bioterrorism planning to respond to such threats.
A population survey
Would Australian general practice be the 
first point of contact during an anthrax 
bioterrorism event?
David N Durrheim
MBChB, DTM&H, DCH, 
MPH&TM, DrPH, FAFPHM, is 
Director of Health Protection, 
Hunter New England 
Population Health, and conjoint 
Professor of Public Health, 
Newcastle University, New 
South Wales and James Cook 
University, Queensland. david.
durrheim@hnehealth.nsw.
gov.au 
Reinhold Muller
MSc, PhD, is Senior 
Statistician, School of Public 
Health, Tropical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation Sciences, James 
Cook University, Queensland.
Vicki L Saunders
BPsych, MPH, is Research 
Officer, School of Public 
Health, Tropical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation Sciences, James 
Cook University, Queensland.
Richard Speare
MB BS, PhD, FAFPHM, is 
Deputy Head of School 
of Public Health, Tropical 
Medicine and Rehabilitation 
Sciences, James Cook 
University, Queensland.
John B Lowe
DrPH, FAHPA, FAAHB, is Head 
of Department of Community 
and Behavioural Science, 
University of Iowa College of 
Public Health, Iowa, USA.
RESEARCH
A population survey – would Australian general practice be the first point of contact during an anthrax bioterrorism event? RESEARCH
Reprinted from Australian Family Physician Vol. 35, No. 3, March 2006  173
complete	the	survey	at	 that	 time,	another	call	
was	made	at	an	agreed	time.	
	 The	 research	 group	 undertook	 standard	
bivariate	test	analyses	(t-tests,	chi-square	tests)	
and	 logistic	 regression	modelling	using	dummy	
coding	 for	 all	 categorical	 variables.	The	 survey	
population’s	 demographic	 data	was	 compared	
with	 those	 of	 the	 Australian	 population.12	
Approval	 was	 granted	 by	 the	 James	 Cook	
University	Human	Ethics	Committee.	
Results
The	 research	 group	 contacted	 1850	 people,	
successful ly	 recruit ing	 1001:	 267	 were	
exclusions	 (38	 chi ldren;	 91	 adults	 with	
limited	 English	 ability;	 nine	 adults	who	were	
incoherent;	 75	 adults	who	were	 contacted	 at	
their	workplace;	 and	 there	was	 no	 answer	 at	
54	 numbers	 despite	 three	 attempts)	 and	 582	
refusals	(response	rate	63.2%).	
	 The	 participants’	 mean	 age	 was	 52.2	
years	 (standard	deviation	17	years);	a	majority	
(62.8%)	were	 female;	 and	most	 (58.6%)	 lived	
in	a	city	 (40.3%	 in	a	 town/village	or	 rural	area	
and	 1.1%	 unstated),	 compared	 to	 66.3%	
of	 the	 Australian	 population.	 The	 highest	
educational	 level	 attained	by	participants	was:	
primary	school	(7.7%);	high	school	grade	10	or	
lower	 (23%);	 completed	 high	 school	 (34.3%);	
completed	 institutes	 for	 tertiary	 and	 further	
education	 or	 trade	 (13.9%);	 and	 university	
graduate	 (19.6%),	 while	 1.6%	 refused	 to	
answer	this	question.	
	 Concern	 about	 the	 risk	 of	 a	 bioterrorism	
attack	 in	 Australia	 was	 perceived	 as	 high	
by	 18.2%	of	 participants,	medium	 by	 39.2%,	
low	 by	 33.9%,	 and	 as	 none	 by	 1.4%;	 7.2%	
did	 not	 know	 and	 0.1%	 (two	 participants)	
refused	 to	 answer.	 Logistic	 regression	
modell ing	 revealed	 that	 increasing	 age	
was	 the	 only	 demographic	 feature	 significantly	
associated	with	 a	 perception	 of	 a	 bioterrorism	
attack	 as	 high	 (as	 opposed	 to	 low,	medium	
or	 none)	 with	 an	 odds	 ratio	 of	 1.016	 per	
year	(p<0.001).	
	 Fourteen	percent	of	 respondents	 incorrectly	
thought	 there	 had	 been	 inhalational	 anthrax	
disease	 in	 Australia	 in	 the	 past	 5	 years;	
27%	 were	 unsure	 (Table 1).	The	 likelihood	
of	 contracting	 ‘anthrax	 of	 the	 lungs’	 if	
working	 in	 close	 contact	with	 someone	with	
the	 disease	 (eg.	 in	 the	 same	 office)	 was	
correctly	 considered	 to	 be	 low	 by	 13.6%;	
medium	 by	 10.1%;	 and	 high	 by	 39.5%	
(don’t	 know	 by	 36.7%;	 0.1%	 elected	 not	
to	answer).13
	 The	research	group	explored	the	acceptance	
of	 vaccination	 against	 anthrax	 under	 different	
hypothetical	 scenarios:	 45.4%	would	 accept	
vaccination	 as	 an	 immediate	 precautionary	
measure;	 46.7%,	 58.3%	 and	 73.8%	would	
accept	 vaccination	 if	 cases	 were	 reported	
somewhere	 in	 the	world,	 Australia,	 or	 their	
own	 community,	 respectively.	 Older	 people	
were	 less	 likely	 to	 accept	 vaccination,	 odds	
ratios	of	0.986	per	year	(p<0.01).	Respondents	
with	 higher	 educational	 achievement	 were	
also	less	likely	(odds	ratio	0.845	per	education	
category,	p<0.01)	 to	 accept	 vaccination	 under	
any	 scenario.	The	 proportion	 of	 respondents	
reporting	 prior	 vaccination	 against	 anthrax	
were:	0.5%	yes,	92.4%	no,	3.7%	don’t	know,	
and	3.4%	did	not	provide	an	answer.	 In	 those	
who	 reported	 no	 prior	 vaccination,	 readiness	
to	 accept	 vaccination	 increased	 as	 the	
hypothetical	 event	 occurred	 physically	 closer	
to	them	(Table 1).
	 A	majority	of	respondents	(59%)	nominated	
their	 general	 practitioner	 when	 asked	 in	 an	
open	 question	where	 they	would	 first	 seek	
diagnosis	 or	 care	 if	 they	 thought	 they	 had	
contracted	 anthrax;	 33%	 nominated	 hospital	
emergency	departments;	4.3%	a	public	health	
department;	 and	 1.8%	 other	 sources	 (1.6%	
did	 not	 know;	 three	 participants	 refused	 to	
answer).	
	 Confidence	 in	 their	 doctor’s	 ability	 to	
recognise	 anthrax	 symptoms	 was	 high	 in	
41.8%;	medium	 in	 29.1%;	 and	 low	 or	 none	
in	 21.9%	 (6.8%	 did	 not	 know,	 and	 five	
participants	 refused	 to	 answer).	 Confidence	
in	 Australian	 health	 authorities’	 ability	 to	
cope	with	 a	 bioterrorism	 attack	was	 high	 in	
only	 19.1%;	medium	 in	 37.1%;	 and	 low	 or	
none	 in	 35.3%	 (8.3%	 didn’t	 know,	 and	 three	
participants	 refused	 to	 answer).	 Preferred	
sources	 of 	 re l iable	 informat ion	 dur ing	
a	 hypothetical	 bioterrorism	 attack	 were	 (to	
an	 open	 question):	 the	media	 (24.9%);	 their	
GP	 (21.6%);	 the	 internet	 (18.2%);	 a	 hospital	
(11.1%);	 and	 the	 government	 (10.8%);	while	
6.1%	 did	 not	 know	 and	 7.4%	 refused	 to	
answer.
Table 1. General knowledge about inhalational anthrax
 n (%)
   Don’t  No answer  
 Yes No know or refused
In the past 5 years, do you think there:
Have been human cases of  
anthrax of the lungs in Australia? 140  (14) 583  (58) 271  (27) 7  (1)
Have been human cases of  
anthrax of the lungs somewhere  
in the world? 722  (72) 131  (13) 146  (15) 2  (0)
Is there an effective medical   
treatment for anthrax of the lungs? 217  (22) 249  (25) 534  (53) 1  (0)
Of the 996 participants not vaccinated,  
those who would accept vaccination 
against anthrax:
As a precautionary measure 452  (45) 457  (46) 42  (4) 45  (5)
If cases were reported in  
the world 466  (47) 427  (43) 46  (5) 57  (6)
If cases were reported in  
Australia 581  (58) 314  (32) 44  (4) 57  (6)
If cases were reported in  
own community  735  (74) 170  (17) 34  (3) 57  (6)
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Discussion
Although	vignettes	have	been	shown	to	predict	
behaviour,14–16	 this	 has	 not	 been	 validated	
for	behaviour	related	to	suspected	bioterrorism	
events.	 Therefore,	 this	 survey	 must	 be	
interpreted	within	 this	 limitation.	 In	 addition,	
there	was	 an	 over	 representation	 of	 English	
speaking	 people,	 women	 (perhaps	 because	
of	 the	 timing	 of	 the	 calls),	 and	 university	
graduates	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 general	
adult	population.	
	 Nonetheless,	 these	 are	 unlikely	 to	 have	
distorted	 the	 survey	 findings,	which	 suggest	
most	 Australians	 are	 concerned	 about	 the	
risk	 of	 a	 bioterrorism	 attack,	 and	 that	 they	
have	 only	 limited	 knowledge	 about	 anthrax.	
Redressing	 this	will	 require	 engaging	 groups	
who	 appear	more	 unwilling	 to	 accept	 public	
health	 measures	 such	 as	 vaccination	 if	
indicated,	 particularly	 the	 elderly	 and	 those	
wi th 	 h igher 	 educat iona l 	 ach ievement .	
However,	 most	 real ised	 they	 were	 not	
immune	 to	 anthrax,	 and	 there	was	 a	 general	
wil l ingness	 to	 accept	 vaccination	 when	
indicated.	The	 anthrax	 vaccine	 for	 human	
use	 is	 not	 registered	 in	 Australia	 and	 can	
only	 be	 imported	 from	 the	 USA	 by	 special	
arrangement.	 The	 complicated	 schedule,	
involving	 six	 intramuscular	 doses	 over	 18	
months	 with	 necessary	 annual	 boosters,	
implies	 that	 anticipatory	 mass	 vaccination	
would	be	difficult,	and	hard	to	justify.17
	 The	 great	 level	 of	 confidence	 in	 GPs’	
abilities	 to	 diagnose	 anthrax	 and	 provide	
credible	 information	 during	 a	 bioterrorism	
event	 is	 important;	 GPs	might	 play	 a	 central	
role	 in	 responding	 to	 a	 threat.18	 Perhaps	 the	
first	 steps	 should	 be	 taken	 toward	 educating	
GPs	to	play	this	pivotal	role.
Implications for general practice
•	Most	Australians	are	concerned	about	the	
risk	of	bioterrorism.
•	GPs	are	likely	be	the	first	point	of	care	if	a	
bioterrorism	attack	is	suspected.
•	GPs	 are	 generally	 regarded	 as	 a	 credible	
source	of	such	information.
•	 GPs	 might	 need	 special	 education	 for	
this	role.
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